

1 federal district court for the district where the action is pending. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). There
2 is a “strong presumption” against removal and “[f]ederal jurisdiction must be rejected if there
3 is any doubt as to the right of removal in the first instance.” *Gaus v. Miles, Inc.*,
4 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992). “The ‘strong presumption’ against removal jurisdiction
5 means that the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” *Id.*
6 This burden is satisfied, however, where “the plaintiff claims a sum greater than the
7 jurisdictional requirement.” *Id.*

8 **II. Motion to Remand.**

9 Defendants assert that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
10 § 1332, which confers jurisdiction to adjudicate cases where the parties are diverse and the
11 amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000. Dkt. #1, ¶¶ 2-7. Plaintiffs’ verified complaint
12 demands \$50,000 in compensatory damages and punitive damages “of at least four times
13 their actual damages[.]” Dkt. #1 at 9-33, ¶ 92. Defendants argue that the amount in
14 controversy is therefore \$250,000. Dkt. #9.

15 In their reply, Plaintiffs offer to withdraw their punitive damages claim and argue that
16 this would bring the amount in controversy below this Court’s jurisdictional minimum. Dkt.
17 #13 at 1-2. For jurisdiction purposes, however, the amount in controversy is determined as
18 of the time of removal. *See St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co.*, 303 U.S. 283, 294
19 (1938). “[E]vents occurring subsequent to removal which reduce the amount recoverable,
20 whether beyond the plaintiff’s control or the result of his volition, do not oust the district
21 court’s jurisdiction once it has attached.” *Id.* at 293; *see In re GMC Pickup Truck Fuel Tank*
22 *Prod. Liab. Litig.*, No. 93-1811, 1993 WL 147245, *2 (E.D. Pa. May 5, 1993) (withdrawal
23 of punitive damages claim after notice of removal was filed did not defeat diversity
24 jurisdiction).


25 Plaintiffs further argue that punitive damages are inherently speculative and that there
26 is no guarantee a jury will award them. Dkt. #7 at 2-3. The Court notes that Plaintiffs
27 request \$50,000 in damages 10 separate times. Dkt. #1-2 at 19-33, ¶¶ 30, 36, 42, 48, 53, 58,
28 66, 74, 82, 88. Paragraph 92 of the verified complaint specifically requests “a punitive

1 damages award of at least four times their actual damages[.]” *Id.* ¶ 92. While any damages
2 award ultimately will be in an amount “deemed appropriate by the trier of fact” (*id.*), the
3 issue for purposes of remand is the amount Plaintiffs have put in controversy.

4 It is true that a general prayer for punitive damages, by itself, may not be sufficient
5 to meet the defendant’s burden of proof. *See Matheson v. Progressive Specialty Ins. Co.*, 319
6 F.3d 1089 (9th Cir. 2003) (finding that complaint seeking “‘in excess’ of \$10,000 for
7 punitive damages” did not clearly satisfy jurisdictional minimum). In this case, however,
8 Plaintiffs’ verified complaint specifies the amount in controversy as “at least” \$250,000.
9 Because Plaintiffs’ verified complaint “states damages in an amount sufficient to obtain
10 federal diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,” *Sanchez*, 102 F.3d at 402, the Court will deny
11 the motion to remand.

12 **IT IS ORDERED** that Plaintiffs’ motion to remand (Dkt. #7) is **denied**.

13 DATED this 9th day of February, 2009.

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17 David G. Campbell
18 United States District Judge
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